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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.

:

ALLEN NELSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20090842-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a conviction for Distribute of or Arranging to Distribute a
Controlled Substance, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(ii) (2007), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Randall Skanchy, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4- 103(2)0) (2008). See Addendum A
(Sentence, Judgment, Conviction).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Nelson's motion for mistrial
where the trial court provided the jury with an erroneous instruction stating Mr. Nelson
had been previously convicted of a crime under the same code section.
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Mahl 2005 UT App 494, <}| 10, 125

P.3d 103 ("[A] trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial and its
decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.") (citation omitted).
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 65:4.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following provisions determinative of the issues on appeal are
located in Addendum B:
U.S. Const. Amend. VI (impartial jury);
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (due process).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 12, 2009, an Information was filed charging Mr. Nelson with one count
of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree
felony. R. 1-2. An amended Information was filed March 26, 2009, charging the offense
as a first degree felony alleging Mr. Nelson had been previously convicted under the
same statute of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. R. 15-16.
A preliminary hearing was held binding the case over for trial. R. 19.
A jury trial was held on July 10, 2009. R. 33-34; 65. Defense counsel made a
motion for mistrial after a jury instruction was given to the jury stating Mr. Nelson had
been convicted previously under the same code section. R. 33; 65:4-6. The trial court
denied the motion, proposing instead a curative instruction. R. 48; 65:6,50; see also Jury
Instr. No. 27A. Defense counsel renewed his motion for mistrial. R. 65:49. The trial
court determined that a curative instruction would be sufficient to cure the error. R.
65:50. The jury found Mr. Nelson guilty of the charged offense. R. 53; 65:70. On
2

September 14, 2009, Mr. Nelson was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than
five years to life. R. 57. A timely notice of appeal was filed on October 8, 2009. R. 59.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A jury trial was held July 10, 2009, where the State presented the testimony of
Detective Steven Bigelow with the Salt Lake City Police Department. R. 65. Bigelow
testified as follows: On March 10, 2009, Bigelow was conducting an undercover
narcotics operation in the area around Pioneer Park and the nearby homeless shelter. R.
65:16, 19. Bigelow's role in the operation as an undercover narcotics detective was to
attempt to purchase crack cocaine from dealers. R. 65:20.
While driving the undercover vehicle, Bigelow saw Mr. Nelson standing next to a
young male, on the sidewalk in front of a business named Club Sound at approximately
575 West and 200 South. R. 65:21, 38-39; State's Ex. 4. The young male's name was
Sued Tursiose Azrazola (Sued); he was from Honduras and appeared to be in his teens
but no evidence was offered about his age.1 R. 65:21, 24, 40. Bigelow testified that
presently "the highest population of drug dealers down there are the Hondurans.. .." R.
65:40. Bigelow explained that Hondurans are "usually the best to buy from, because . . .
they're not usually homeless" and have "the resources available" to "get a little more
product

" R. 65:40.

Bigelow testified that Mr. Nelson and Sued were standing within inches of each
other. R. 65:23. Bigelow stated he made eye contact with Mr. Nelson and drove up and

1

The State informed the jury that Sued had been deported out of the country by ICE. R.
65:10.
3

parked his car right next to where Mr. Nelson was standing. R. 65:21. Bigelow rolled
down the passenger window and Mr. Nelson asked "What do you need?" R. 65:21, 33.
Bigelow said "I need a 20." R. 65:21, 33. Bigelow testified that usually if you are "just
looking for the crack cocaine, you can just say how much you want, usually CI need a 20,'
T need a 40.' That's indicating you want $20 worth of the crack cocaine." R. 65:18, 21,
42-43.
Bigelow testified that Sued appeared nervous when Bigelow told Mr. Nelson he
needed a 20 and didn't seem to know what to do. R. 65:21, 33. Bigelow testified that
Sued looked at Mr. Nelson and at that point, Mr. Nelson "nudged" Sued towards
Bigelow's vehicle. R. 65:21. Bigelow testified that Sued "didn't seem to want to make
eye contact with" Bigelow and Sued did not say a word throughout the transaction. R.
65:24. Sued opened the passenger door and got into the vehicle. R. 65:21. When
Bigelow told him he needed a "20," it did not appear Sued understood what he was
saying. R. 65:22. Bigelow wasn't sure whether Sued spoke English but Bigelow
believed he didn't because Sued didn't communicate with him and it appeared to
Bigelow that Mr. Nelson was "helping him out," by acting as a translator. R. 65:24, 3132. However, Bigelow did not mention in his police report that Sued was nervous, did
not speak English or that he had any trouble communicating. R. 65:41-42. Bigelow
testified that Mr. Nelson was translating not through words but though his body language
by nudging Sued and saying, "'Give him the 20. Give him the 20.'" R. 65:22, 32.
Bigelow was uncertain whether Mr. Nelson's statement to "'[g]ive him the 20'" was
directed at Sued or Bigelow. R. 65:33.
4

Sued spat out a plastic twist containing crack cocaine and the detective completed
the transaction in the vehicle. R. 65:22. Bigelow testified that Sued got out of his vehicle
and again stood next to Mr. Nelson. R. 65:22. Bigelow drove away eastbound on
Second South and the "takedown signal" was given. R. 65:22, 39. When Mr. Nelson
was arrested, no drugs, drug paraphernalia or money was found on his person. R. 65:34.
Although the $20 bill used in the drug transaction was recovered, the officer who
searched Mr. Nelson and Sued could not remember which person they found the money
on. R. 65:35, 36.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error in denying Mr. Nelson's motion for a
mistrial after a jury instruction was given to the jury stating Mr. Nelson had previously
been convicted of a crime under the same statutory section. The inclusion of the jury
instruction denied Mr. Nelson a fair trial by an impartial jury in violation of due process
and the Sixth Amendment. The trial court's abuse of discretion in denying Mr. Nelson's
motion for mistrial requires reversal where it was prejudicial in that there is a reasonable
likelihood that Mr. Nelson would have received a more favorable result given the State's
dearth of evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FAILING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL AFTER INCLUDING A JURY
INSTRUCTION REFERENCING DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION.
A trial court properly exercises its discretion in granting a motion for mistrial
"'where the circumstances are such as to reasonably indicate . . . that a fair trial cannot be
5

had' and that a mistrial is necessary in order to avoid injustice." State v. Wach, 2001 UT
35, <|}45, 24 P.3d 948 (deference is given to the trial court's "advantaged position . . . to
determine the impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings").
Mr. Nelson maintains that the trial court was plainly wrong in denying his motion for
mistrial where the erroneous jury instruction given to the jury indicating Mr. Nelson had
been previously convicted of a crime under the same code section denied him of a fair
trial by an impartial jury in violation of due process and the Sixth Amendment. R. 39;
65:4-6, 48-50; see State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^46, 27 P.3d 1133 (trial court's
denial of a motion for mistrial is reversible where the determination "'is plainly wrong in
that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have
had a fair trial. . . .'"); U.S. Const. Amend VI, XIV. The trial court's denial of the motion
for mistrial constitutes reversible error because it was sufficiently prejudicial in that there
was '"a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable
result'" for Mr. Nelson due to the dearth of evidence presented to sustain a conviction.
State v. Pritchett 2003 UT 24, ^[10, 69 P.3d 1278 (quotations and citation omitted).
In this case, the jury was given a copy of the jury instructions to follow along with
while the trial court read them aloud to the jury. R. 65:3. Included in the jury
instructions given and being read to the jury by the trial court was the statement that "the
defendant having been previously convicted under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)." R.
39; 65:4. The trial court began reading Instruction No. 5 regarding the charges Mr.
Nelson was alleged to have committed stating :

6

Distribution or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, Section 5837-8(l)(a)(ii)? Utah code Annotated as follows: That on or about March
10th, 2009 at 575 West 200 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
defendant, having ~ let's see - the defendant - let's just skip that, and you
may cross that out. That has been stricken. If you have a pen, do so.
R. 74:5.
After asking the members of the jury to cross out the statement regarding the
previous conviction by the defendant, the trial court reread the instruction and continued
reading thirteen more jury instructions before concluding. R. 74:2-11. After the jury was
excused, Mr. Nelson moved for a mistrial arguing that despite the trial court's ability to
catch the erroneous statement before reading it aloud to the jury, the jurors were
following along with their written copy of the instructions. R. 65:4. Mr. Nelson argued
that the jury having read that he was previously convicted of a crime under the same code
section was going to highly prejudice the jury, denying him of the right to a fair trial by
an impartial jury in violation of due process. R. 65:4. The State agreed that an error
occurred with the inclusion of the statement regarding Mr. Nelson's previous conviction
into the jury instructions but believed the error could be "cured and rendered harmless by
an explanatory instruction from the Court." R. 65:5.
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial determining the error could be cured
with an instruction.
I've asked [the jury] as we went through that to strike it. .. . Really, that's
an error that lies with the Court. I know that the language of the document,
or at least of the offending sentence indicates "the defendant having been
previously convicted," and gives no indication of what that previous
conviction will be. The taint is lessened to some extent. I certainly would
agree that as I asked them to do, they followed along as I am reading it. So
I'm certain that they were following along, but I've asked them to strike it.
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I'll provide a curative instruction that speaks about the fact that that's an
error from the Court's—the Court's inclusion from stock instructions, and
that that's not apart of the charge in this case, and that no evidence is being
presented on any—anything akin to it.
R. 65:6.
The jury was brought back into the courtroom and the trial resumed. R. 65:7-48.
After both sides had rested, the trial court excused the jury before going over the
concluding jury instructions. R. 65:48. The trial court proposed Jury Instruction No.
27A as a curative instruction. R. 48;65:48. Instruction 27A read:
The Court previously instructed you to delete certain language in
Instruction No. 5 which you have done. This court prepared Instruction
No. 5 from a standard set of Instructions and inadvertently included the
language you have been asked to delete from another Instruction. It is not a
part of this charge, was inadvertently included in it, and no evidence has
been presented in this case to support such a statement. Accordingly, you
should disregard that language.
R.48.
Mr. Nelson renewed his motion for mistrial arguing the curative instruction was
not adequate to cure the prejudicial error. R. 65:49. The State argued the instruction was
adequate to cure the error. R. 65:50. However, it suggested that it might be wise for the
court to replace the instruction that the jury has "so that they don't have it to read over
and over again, because I believe they still have that instruction with that language in it."
R. 65:50. In denying Mr. Nelson's renewed motion for mistrial the court stated:
I told them to cross it out. I think I believe that I saw them doing such. If I
were to ask for the instructions and to white them out, it draws the same
attention to it. If I were to replace that instruction, I believe it draws more
attention to it. This instruction indicates it was made by a mistake,
included inadvertently and is not part of the charge, and has no evidence to
support it and they should disregard it. I think that is sufficient.
8

R. 65:50.
After the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the trial judge indicated that
he hoped the jury had their written instructions as he was going to finish reading the
remainder of instructions along with additional ones that have been supplemented. R.
65:51;74:11-16.
The trial court's failure to declare a mistrial after the jury was tainted by the
erroneous statement that Mr. Nelson had previously been convicted of a crime under the
same statutory section was an abuse of discretion. The court was incorrect in
determining that there was no indication in that erroneous statement what the prior
conviction was for and therefore the "taint" was less. R. 65:6. The statement was highly
prejudicial and denied Mr. Nelson of the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury in
violation of due process and the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI, XIV;
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 , 560 (1967) (noting that because evidence of prior
offenses "is generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice, it is usually excluded
.. . ."); State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, ^12, 189 P.3d 69 ("acknowledge[ing] that
'the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant prejudice.'")
(citation omitted). Given that the State had very little evidence to support the offense
charged against Mr. Nelson, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have
returned a more favorable verdict about the error.
Mr. Nelson was charged with one count of distribution of or arranging to distribute
a controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (2007). Under
9

the statute the State must be able to show that "an offer, agreement, consent, or
arrangement to distribute controlled substances was made by [Mr. Nelson] and , . .. that
the behavior was 'engaged in knowingly or with intent that such distribution would, or
would be likely to, occur.'" State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, %9, 3 P.3d 725 (citing
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979)). "To be guilty of arranging" it was
necessary for Mr. Nelson to have "committed some 'act in furtherance of an
arrangement5 to distribute controlled substances." IdL at ^flO (citation omitted). "Intent to
commit a crime can be 'inferred from the actions of the defendant or from surrounding
circumstances.'" Id. at <p 1.
To support its allegation that Mr. Nelson intended to arrange the distribution of a
controlled substance, the State presented the testimony of the undercover detective
Steven Bigelow. R. 65:15-44; 46-47. The State admitted to the jury during its opening
statement that the only people who knew what happened that day were the detective,
Sued, and Mr. Nelson. R. 65:10. And because Sued had been deported out of the
country by ICE, the State's case rested entirely on the detective's testimony. R. 65:10.
Detective Bigelow testified that he was attempting to purchase crack cocaine as part of
his undercover narcotics operation in the area around Pioneer Park. R. 65: 20. While
driving his vehicle, Bigelow saw Sued and Mr. Nelson standing close together on a
sidewalk in front of a business. R. 65:21, 38-39.
Bigelow testified that he made eye contact with Mr. Nelson as he pulled his car up
next to where Sued and Mr. Nelson were standing. R. 65:21. Bigelow rolled down the
passenger window and Mr. Nelson asked "What do you need?" R. 65:21, 33. Bigelow
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responded that he needed "a 20." R. 65:21,33. Although never mentioned in Bigelow's
report, he testified that Sued appeared nervous and did not know what to do. R. 65:18,
33. Bigelow testified that Sued looked at Mr. Nelson and Mr. Nelson "nudged" Sued
towards Bigelow's vehicle. R. 65:21. Sued got into the vehicle with Bigelow and
Bigelow told him he needed a "20." R. 65:22. Bigelow could hear Mr. Nelson yelling
"Give him the 20. Give him the 20." R. 65:22. However, Bigelow did not know if Mr.
Nelson's comment was directed at him or Sued. R. 65:33.
Bigelow testified that Sued did not speak throughout the transaction and it
appeared that Sued did not understand what Bigelow was saying. R. 65:22, 24. Bigelow
was unsure whether Sued spoke English but believed that he didn't and testified that it
appeared Mr. Nelson was acting as his translator. R. 65:24, 31-32. Bigelow testified that
Mr. Nelson was not translating verbally but through his body language by nudging Sued
and saying "Give him the 20. Give him the 20." R. 65:21-22, 32. Bigelow did not
include in his police report that Sued was nervous, did not speak English or that he had
any trouble communicating. R. 65:41-42. At this point, Sued spat out a plastic twist of
crack cocaine and Bigelow and Sued made the exchange. R. 65:22. Sued got back out of
the vehicle and stood next to Mr. Nelson again. R. 65:22. After Bigelow gave the
"takedown signal," both Mr. Nelson and Sued were arrested. R. 65:22, 39. No drugs,
drug paraphernalia or money was found on Mr. Nelson's person. R. 65:34.
When viewing the State's scant evidence from their only witness, it is easy to
conclude that, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have
returned with a verdict more favorable to Mr. Nelson on the arranging to distribute
11

charge. The whole of the State's evidence left a question as to whether Mr. Nelson was
actually part of the transaction or otherwise had the intent to arrange the distribution of a
controlled substance. The dearth of evidence supports that the improper statement
included in the jury instruction affected the substantial rights of Mr. Nelson. Due to the
prejudicial effect of that statement, a curative instruction was not sufficient to obviate the
problem. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998) ("Some errors may be too
prejudicial for curative instructions to mitigate their effect, and a new trial may be the
only proper remedy.")- The jurors read that Mr. Nelson had been previously convicted
under the same statutory section that he was again being accused of violating. Although
the judge asked the jurors to cross out the language, it is unclear whether they did or were
able to do so. As the State pointed out, without removing the offending jury instructions,
the juror's were able to take it back with them in deliberations and read it over and over
again.
Under the facts of this case, it cannot be said that Mr. Nelson received a fair trial
and "a mistrial [was] necessary in order to avoid injustice." Wach, 2001 UT 35 at ^[45.
Therefore, the trial court's denial of Mr. Nelson's motion for mistrial is reversible error
where the determination was plainly wrong in "that the incident so likely influenced the
jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial" by an impartial jury.
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at Tf46.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial and remand for a new trial.
12

SUBMITTED this ^

day of May, 2010.

DEBRA M. NELSON
Attorney for Appellant
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

